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Abstract
Estimation of forward-looking interest rate rules is ubiquitous in the context
of developed-economy central banks. This paper considers the ﬁve countries in
Latin America that have adopted the Inﬂation Targeting framework and performs
estimations of forward-looking rules via i) standard least-squares criteria and ii)
quantile regressions. The estimated standard mean eﬀects indicate that Brazil,
Chile and Mexico are strongly forward-looking for horizons of a year and more.
The estimated quantile eﬀects suggest that policy makers in Brazil, Chile and
Mexico are likely to have faced more upside than downside risks to their one-year
ahead inﬂation forecasts when setting their policies.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E52, E47.
Keywords: Quantile regressions, Monetary Policy.
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11 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to empirically estimate forward-looking monetary policy
behaviour in the ﬁve countries in Latin America that have adopted the inﬂation targeting
regime so far (IT henceforth): Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru1.
In recent times, monetary policy in Latin America has been characterised by the evolving
pattern in the use of intermediate targets and policy instruments, as a result, central
banks and specially ITers2 have tended to use a controllable short term nominal interest
rate as their preferred policy instrument3. This has been very important because it
has allowed to have a better measure of monetary policy stance and has opened the
possibility to perform econometric analysis.
Regarding the management of the policy instrument, most central bankers in the world
either in developed or emerging-market countries, either ITers or non-ITers; justify
forward-looking monetary policy making.4. At the theoretical level, inﬂation forecasts
can be considered as intermediate targets in the implementation of forward-looking
policy5 On the empirical side, Clarida et.al (1998) and Orphanides (2001) initiated a
research agenda devoted to the estimation of forward-looking interest rate feedback
rules.
However, there is one dimension of analysis that has had scant attention in the empirical
estimation of monetary policy reaction functions. As suggested by Goodhart (2001) and
recently by Greenspan (2004) and King (2004), when policymakers take decisions, they
pay considerable attention to the risks in the foreseeable future. It is not only the most
likely or baseline forecasts that is important. The low-probability, high-impact events
and the nature of the shocks6 that shape the probabilistic distribution of forecasts are
also key.
In the discussion to FED Chairman Alan Greenspan’s ”Risk and Uncertainty in
Monetary Policy”, during the 2004 Annual Meeting of the American Economic
Association, Mervin King, governor of the Bank of England, reﬂects on the risk
management approach to central banking
Greenspan deﬁnes the [risk management] approach by saying that policy
makers should look at a range of ”risks” to output and inﬂation; and give due
consideration to those risks when setting policy. He argues that policy makers
1 Monetary policy options in Latin America have in general converged to the three strategies outlined
in Mishkin and Savastano (2001); full-dollarisation, monetary targeting and inﬂation targeting (IT).
2 See for example Armas and Grippa (2005), Minella et.al (2003), Landerretche et.al (1999), Restrepo
(1999) and Torres (2003) for country-speciﬁc cases
3 Adoption of IT by developing countries is not the only reason. The changing structure of their
economies together with developments in interbank markets and ﬁnancial institutions have facilitated
central banks to endorse interest rates instead of other instruments.
4 A perusal of Inﬂation Reports and formal communication from web pages of various, heterogeneous
central banks easily conﬁrms that assertion.
5 See Svensson (1997)
6 Their persistent or transitory features and their qualiﬁcation as supply or demand driven shocks.
2cannot just rely on the forecasts from a structural model of the economy when
even deep parameters are drifting. They should also use their judgement;
compare current experiences with previous, similar episodes; and continually
test and update a range of reduced-form models, which should help give some
insight into how the economy is evolving.
This is the approach taken at the Bank of England, where the Monetary
Policy Committee takes into account the entire distribution of future
outcomes for inﬂation and output when setting interest rates. A ”fanchart”
for its forecasts of both inﬂation and output is published in the quarterly
Inﬂation Report.
This is also the case within Latin American ITers. The systematic inclusion of balance
of risks discussions within their Inﬂation Reports suggests that their views and decisions
are somehow shaped by the outlook of risks surrounding the inﬂation forecast.
In light of these considerations, the aim of this paper is to estimate forward-looking
behaviour encompassed in the dynamics of interest rates in relation to measures of
inﬂation forecasts. To this end, we deﬁne the lagged interest rate and a predetermined
inﬂation forecast as the conditioning variables that aﬀect the interest rate setting at any
given time.
First, we are interested in the mean interest rate eﬀect. In order to do so, simple linear
forward-looking interest rate rules are estimated by standard ordinary least squares
techniques at diﬀerent possible forecast horizons.
Second, in order to have a broader information than that provided by the mean OLS
estimates, we perform the estimation of quantile eﬀects; namely, the response of the
interest rate at the diﬀerent quantiles of its conditioning distribution. This is done
by estimating linear quantile regression models as documented in Koenker (2005).
The quantile estimates provide a broader picture of interest rate behaviour and can
potentially shed light on the probabilistic nature of interest responses against the
backdrop of the myriad of risks Latin American ITers face.
Therefore, the technique applied in the paper provides one way to extract information
from the data to characterise forward-looking behaviour under both the spectrum of risks
and the attitudes towards those risks policy makers have. This is particularly important
in Latin America, given the many risk factors aﬀecting baseline inﬂation forecasts.
The paper proceeds as follows, in section 2 we set the linear forward-looking response
regression, in section 3 we do so for the quantile regression model, in section 4 we describe
the data used in the estimations, and in section 5 we conclude with ﬁnal remarks.
32 Mean forward-looking responses
The empirical literature on forward-looking interest rate rules have focused primarily
on developed countries; Clarida et.al (1998) and Orphanides (2001)7 showed for the
ﬁrst time the relevance of policy driven by future expected outcomes. In the speciﬁc
context of Latin America, several country speciﬁc studies like Restrepo (1999), Minella
et.al (2003), Torres (2003) and Ramos and Torres (2005) deal with the estimation of
forward-looking policy rules for Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico.
The econometric approach for the estimation of these type of rules, follows two
directions. First the GMM methodology advocated in Clarida et.al (1998) which is
followed by Restrepo (1999) and Ramos and Torres (2005). The second approach -
pioneered by Orphanides (2001) - consists in using real-time forecasts available at the
time of every interest rate decision and it is used for example in Jansson and Vredin
(2003), Kuttner (2004) and Goodhart (2005). For the Latin American case, Ramos and
Torres (2005) use forecasts from surveys instead of own-central bank forecasts while
Minella et.al (2003) construct estimates with central bank forecasts.
In this paper we follow more closely this latter approach of treating forecasts directly
as explanatory variables. As it will be explained in section 4, we use monthly series.
Also, given that it is practically impossible to obtain central banks’ own forecasts for
the period under study, we rely instead on consensus forecasts of private agents gathered
by Consensus Economics. These forecasts, in the form of monthly vintages, mimic the
real-time data sets used for example in Orphanides (2001). However, we reckon that
these forecasts might not be appropriate because they might indeed diﬀer from central
banks’ own forecasts8. For the time being, we need to assume that the data set at hand
captures the fundamental dynamics of central banks’ own forecasts.
In all the countries under study we use a relevant interbank rate as the monetary policy
operational target(See ﬁgure 1)9. This is not exactly true for Mexico where the policy
instrument is deﬁned as the cumulative balance of commercial banks’ current accounts
at the Central Bank10. Nevertheless, according to Torres (2003), during the period under
study the interbank rate is already a good indicator of Banco de Mexico monetary policy
stance.
As apposed to IT practice in advanced economies, Latin American IT still displays
diﬀerent degrees of convergence. Some countries are still on the way or have just
converged to a stationary inﬂation target (See Figure 2), in such cases, the policy horizon
is not clearly discernible. Others, like Chile have explicitly announced a ﬁxed policy
horizon of more than a year. Unfortunately, our data at hand allow us to have complete
times series only up to 13-months-ahead inﬂation forecasts11. This will limit our results
7 The working paper versions appeared both in 1997.
8 It is reasonable to think that central banks react basically to their internal forecasts
9 In this study, the operational target is also the policy instrument as operational issues are totally
abstracted.
10 Known as the ’corto’.
11 Including the month when the decision is taken.
4along the horizon dimension as responses to horizons more than 13 months ahead can
not be calculated. Yet, the data can already show some important eﬀects at available
longer horizons.
In this study we assume that the monthly interest rate behaves according to the following
equation













Where it is the policy rate, π
f
t−1,t+h is the year-on-year, h-months-ahead inﬂation forecast
made in the month prior the policy decision is taken, πo
t,t+h is the numerical, ex-ante
inﬂation target known at time t and to be achieved at time t + h, in
t is the neutral
short-term interest rate, and εt represents all other possible sources of interest rate
change12.
To be able to diminish the bias arising from simultaneous dependence, interest rate
decisions at time t depend on forecasts made before the decision (time t−1). However,
those forecasts made at time t − 1 implicitly assume an expected path of interest rates
and a particular value of interest rates for period t that is highly correlated with period
t−1 interest rates13. Therefore we postulate a relatively strong assumption of exogeneity
of last-period forecasts to the current and future interest rate decisions.
According to equation [1] we can calculate the mean interest rate decision conditional
on information available at each decision step













Where Ωt is the information set policy makers have before any time-t interest rate
decision. This set is comprised by the lagged interest rate, the neutral interest rate and
the deviations of predetermined, last-period inﬂation forecast from the planned target14.
We assume that E[εt | Ωt] = 0.
3 Quantile forward-looking responses
The key element in standard rule estimations of [2] is the use of linear regressions and
the least squares method to estimate what we call the mean response of the instrument.
If the estimated errors are normal, the mean response is a good descriptor and not much
12 This sources of interest rate variations can be serially correlated.
13 See Kim and Nelson (2004). There, it is argued that to for the exercise to be clean, the forecasts
must assume a constant interest rate, to avoid simultaneous equation bias
14 We use de term ”planned” target because in some circumstances such as Brazil, targets have been
adjusted ex-post. See Minella et.al (2003).
5else can be said. However, if the errors are not gaussian, Koenker and Bassett (1978)
show that some features can be extracted from applying quantile regressions.
In order to setup the quantile regression framework, the model in [1] can be transformed
in:
e it = ρe it−1 + αe π
f
t−1,t+h + εt (3)
Where we have transformed the variables in e it = it − in
t and e it−1 = it−1 − in
t as






t,t+h denoting the sensitivity of interest rates and the inﬂation
deviations from target respectively.
The quantile regression model considers:
e it = ρ(γ)e it−1 + α(γ)e π
f
t−1,t+h + εγt (4)
Where γ ∈ [0,1] represents the orders upon quantiles are calculated (for example, when
γ = 0.5 we calculate median eﬀects). The distribution of εγt is not know, it is only
assumed that the conditional quantile of the error term is Qγ (εγt | Ωt) = 0. Then, the
conditional γ-quantile response is
Qγ





= ρ(γ)e it−1 + α(γ)e π
f
t−1,t+h (5)
Koenker (2005) show that the parameters of the regression model for any γ ∈ [0,1] can











Where qγ(εγt) is the quantile regression weight function given by qγ(εγt) = γ − I(εγt<0)
(note that I(εγt<0) is the standard indicator function). For example, in the median case
γ = 1
2 then q0.5 (εγt) is either 1
2 or −1
2 depending on the sign of εγt. In that case,
deviation above or below εγt are weighted similarly. In all other cases within the space
[0,1], deviations are weighted asymmetrically.
The minimisation and hence the estimation of the parameters of interest relies on linear
programming methods outlined ﬁrst in Koenker and Bassett (1978)16. In order to get
conﬁdence intervals, the standard errors can be obtained by bootstrap methods.
15 As explained in Koenker and Bassett (1978); Koenker (2005), this is a parallel to the ordinary least
squares minimisation where the aim is to minimise the sum of squared functions.
16 See Koenker (2005) for details and more references of time series applications and quantile
autoregressions.
6The quantile regression approach outlined here is potentially useful for assessing
monetary policy behaviour. It can shed light on the response of interest rates at the
lower and upper ends of the distribution of the inﬂation forecast.
For example, during the period of analysis we might ﬁnd that for a particular ITer,
interest rates might react strongly at the upper end of the distribution (at the higher
quantiles) but less strongly at the lower end of the distribution (at the lower quantiles).
If the distribution of inﬂation forecasts have been such that the upper end of the
distribution have been outside permissible ranges but the lower end have been mostly
closed to the target then the above ﬁnding is compatible with a central bank trying
to curve upside risks. This is the asymmetric-risks interpretation related to the risk
management approach quoted in the introductory section.
Another possible interpretation is that the above behaviour might have been the result
of an asymmetric loss function of a central bank that, given overall balanced risks, have
reacted more to upper end parts of the forecast distribution than to the lower parts.
Hence central bank behaviour can be driven by asymmetric risks, asymmetric losses
or a combination of both. Unfortunately, given the available data we can not identify
the sources of such a behaviour, only that the particular behaviour has been present
throughout the historical sample.
4 The Data
Our basic data set for each country comprises monthly series running from 1996
onwards of the following series: interbank interest rates, monthly series of consensus
forecasts gathered by Consensus Economics, an index of economic activity17 and nominal
exchange rates.
Using the nominal interest rate series, we construct ex-post real interest rate series which
are then decomposed in trend and cycle. The trend is used as a proxy for time-varying
neutral real interest rates which are then summed to corresponding inﬂation targets to
obtain neutral nominal interest rate series to be used in the regressions.
Regarding the consensus forecast, the surveys only contain forecast for the current and
next year-end inﬂation rates18. The survey reports are released on the second half of
every month and therefore the current month is always part of the forecast. Given
observed inﬂation rates within the year, the current end-year inﬂation forecast imply
a residual inﬂation for the rest of the current year. Additionally using next year-end
forecasts, it is possible to construct h-month implied forecasts. Given the pattern of the
surveys, it is only possible to obtain complete times series of 13-months ahead implied
inﬂation forecast.
17 For the case of Mexico and Colombia we do not have an index of economic activity, instead we use
monthly indices of industrial production
18 See ﬁgures 3 and 4 where these series are plotted. Minor interpolation is done there to complete
missing data.
7The data set covers the period until November 2005. For the regressions, we consider




On ﬁgure 5 we observe the diﬀerent responses of the systematic part of interest rates to
deviations of inﬂation forecasts for horizons 0 to 12 months ahead together with their
one-standard deviation conﬁdence interval. If the mean estimate statistically exceeds
unity then we have some evidence that the stabilising Taylor principle applies.
We observe that the responses increase as the forecast horizon rise in the case of Brazil,
Chile and Mexico, reaching values of near or more than one for the 12-month ahead
forecasts. These results at the end-horizons are in line with those reported in Minella
et.al (2003) for Brazil, and Restrepo (1999) for Chile and Ramos and Torres (2005) for
Mexico.
In the case of Colombia the results show a very mild and statistically lower-than-one
response of interest rate at the higher-end horizons. Taken at face value, this would
indicate that monetary policy in Colombia might not have been responding enough to
stabilise inﬂation. However, we should warn that these results might reﬂect the fact that
the consensus forecast data for Colombia might be ill-suited for the case at hand. Also,
it might reﬂect the failure to adequately capture monetary policy stance throughout the
whole sample.
In the case of Peru, the responses to consensus forecasts are statistically signiﬁcant
and close to unity up to about 7 months ahead inﬂation forecasts. For longer horizons
the statistical signiﬁcance vanishes. In this case, the results suggest that the monetary
policy horizon in Peru has been lower than a year. This result might reﬂect the fact that
- during the period of analysis - the policy target in Peru was set on a calendar year-end
basis and not o a ﬁxed horizon of a year or more which is the approximate monetary
control lag in Peru 19.
As in the Colombian case, however we warn that the result might be just the mirror of
an inadequate forecast series and that the use of the own-inﬂation forecast might change
the results in a signiﬁcant way.
What are the lessons to be learned from this pieces of evidence? First the paper tends
to conﬁrm previous ﬁndings of forward-looking behaviour for Brazil, Chile and Mexico.
Second, it opens the question of the proper characterisation of monetary policy in
Colombia and Peru within the sample; robustness, additional explanatory variables,
etc.
19 See Central Bank of Peru (2005)
85.2 Quantile responses
Figure 6 depicts 5 panels showing the quantile responses of interest rates to one-year-
ahead inﬂation forecasts together with the mean responses and their respective 95
percent conﬁdence intervals. For the case of Peru we have considered 7 months ahead
inﬂation forecasts because this is the relevant horizon reﬂected in the data.
For example, a 0.9 percentile eﬀect (the responses on the right hand side of the panels)
shows how the interest rate responds to inﬂation forecast deviations that are higher than
the 90 percent of all forecast deviations, namely the response of the interest rates at the
upper tail of the inﬂation forecast deviation distribution. Conversely, the 0.1 percentile
eﬀect shows the responses at the lower tail. In other words, the eﬀects at the edges
of the panels show how interest rates would respond under extreme expected inﬂation
deviations. If the forecast distributions are skewed to the right on average then a central
bank might react statistically more, equal or less than the mean response.
In a completely symmetric world, we would expect the responses at all points of the
distribution to be very close to the mean responses and statistically the same.
When a response is low at the lower tail and high at the upper tail such as the case of
Brazil, Chile and Mexico we can interpret that - provided that the monetary policy loss
functions are symmetric - the inﬂation risks during the sample might have been to the
upside and that monetary policy have in fact reacted aggressively against those risks,
even more than the median eﬀect would suggest.
For the case of Peru, policy responses at the upper tails of the inﬂation forecast
distribution have been lower than the mean responses. This is an indication that the
Central Bank of Peru have tended not to strongly respond to upside risks to their
inﬂation forecasts. With such a low policy horizon (7 months), upside risk balances
reﬂect inﬂationary factors to which it is not desirable to respond aggressively.
All in all, these results point to the fact that symmetry is not a feature of policy
behaviour within Latin American ITers. Rather, skewed risks and particular responses
to them tend to deny the standard quadratic loss functions used in the literature about
optimal policy rules.
6 Concluding remarks
We have performed mean and quantile response estimations of forward-looking monetary
policy behaviour for the ﬁve ITers in Latin America.
Using the mean response estimation we have found that monetary policy behaviour in
these countries is forward-looking. Moreover, the use of a control lag of more than a year
suggested in the results for Brazil, Chile and Mexico is akin to the practice of central
banks in developed countries. Possible data problems or possible shorter control lags
characterise the Colombian and Peruvian case.
9The quantile regression estimates give us some key directions of the risks surrounding
monetary policy decisions in these countries. We have interpreted that Brazil, Chile and
Mexico have faced upside risks to inﬂation during their recent monetary policy history
and that these upside risks have somewhat prompted stronger interest rate responses20.
We ﬁnd some weak evidence that Peru is likely to have faced upside risk to which the
authorities did not reacted in the expected fashion, possibly due to the short policy
horizon in place.
Further research is necessary in order to relate the above ﬁndings to institutional features
of each ITer. For example, the way the central bank policy mandate is deﬁned, the type
of IT design or the macroeconomic structure of the country might all shape the speciﬁc
way monetary policy is conducted.
The above econometric assessment of forward-looking behaviour is positive. An avenue
of future research is to analyse the interplay between optimal policy under skewed risks
conditional on a typical economic structure of Latin American inﬂation targeters.
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11Figure 1: Policy rates and estimated neutral interest rates
































12Figure 2: Inﬂation rates and ex-ante targets





































13Figure 3: Current year-end consensus forecasts: Dotted lines are the actual data and



























14Figure 4: Next year-end consensus forecasts: Dotted lines are the actual data and
































15Figure 5: Mean responses to h-period ahead inﬂation forecasts






































































































Mean responses of interest rates to h−months ahead inflation forecasts
Concensus Forecasts
one SD interval
16Figure 6: Quantile responses to relevant forecast horizons














































































Responses of interest rates to 1−year−ahead inflation forecasts
Mean effect
95 percent mean effect
confidence interval
Percentile effects
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